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THE INCALCULABLE RISK: HOW THE WORLD TRADE
CENTER DISASTER ACCELERATED THE EVOLUTION
OF INSURANCE TERRORISM EXCLUSIONS
"The deliberate and deadly attacks, which were carried out yes-
terday against our country, were more than acts of terror. They
were acts of war."
-President George W. Bush, September 12, 2001.'
"[Biased on our analysis it seems clear that the attacks in New
York, on the Pentagon, or on the plane that crashed in Pennsyl-
vania do not constitute 'acts of war' as contemplated by the lan-
guage of these [insurance policy] exclusions."
-Commissioner James C. Bernstein, Minnesota Commerce
Department Insurance Division, September 24, 2001.2
I. INTRODUCTION
For all practical purposes-including the quintessentially utili-
tarian matter of insurance-the last vestiges of the distinction
between war and international terrorism went up in smoke along
with the twin towers of the World Trade Center on September 11,
2001. Though in many contexts these constructs remain viable
and distinguishable in a theoretical legal sense, in the pragmatic
mathematical realm of the actuary, both war and international
terrorism now represent incalculable risks capable of rendering
1. President George W. Bush, Remarks at End of Cabinet Room Meeting with Na-
tional Security Team (Sept. 12, 2001), in Text of Bush Statement, WASH. POST, Sept. 13,
2001, at A3.
2. Press Release, Minnesota Commerce Department, Insurance Division, Statement
of Minnesota Commerce Commissioner James C. Bernstein, Insurance Policy "Act of War"
Exclusion (Sept. 24, 2001), available at http://www.commerce.state.mn.us/pagesfNewsRe-
leases/Releases2001INewsOlO924.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
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key elements of the insurance industry insolvent.3 The line be-
tween transnational terrorism and warfare was obscured by the
attacks to the point of nonexistence in the perception of Ameri-
cans-irrespective of the intricacies of international law. That
fact is evidenced not only by the words of President Bush, but
ironically, by those of congressional leaders, who admonished the
insurance industry, days after the attacks, not to lose sight of the
distinction.
Fearful that insurers would attempt to invoke standard policy
exclusions for losses due to "war or acts of war" in the aftermath
of the disaster, members of the House Financial Services Com-
mittee and the Insurance Subcommittee directed a letter to the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC"), 4
downplaying the President's war rhetoric as a mere reflection of
"the passion and determination of our country, not the legal real-
ity of Tuesday's destruction."' Yet, in subtly revealing terminol-
3. A week after the attacks, Steven J. Dreyer, Managing Director for U.S. Insurance
Industry Ratings at Standard & Poor's, commented that the insurance industry could
"withstand an enormous financial hit .... [Tihe totals would have to exceed [fifty billion
dollars] before we would begin to worry about the insurance system." Scott Farley, U.S.
Attack 'Will Not Cripple the Insurance Industry,' INS. DAY (London), Sept. 18, 2001, at 3,
available at LEXIS, News Library, Insday File. By recent estimates, the total financial
impact on insurers worldwide could reach 70 billion dollars. Claire Wilkinson, Final Cost
from WTC 'Could Exceed $70bn,' INS. DAY (London), Nov. 7, 2001, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Insday File. This would far surpass the $15.5 billion in total claims result-
ing from Hurricane Andrew in 1992, the most catastrophic single event on record prior to
the September 11 attacks. Linda Stern, Processing a $25 Billion Claim: The Insurance In-
dustry Gears Up for Massive Settlements, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 24, 2001, at 56. It would dwarf
the $775 million outlay for claims associated with the 1992 Los Angeles riots, the most
expensive man-made disaster in the past one hundred years. At the Top of a Terrible List,
Bus. WK., Sept. 24, 2001, at 12. According to Insurance Services Office, Inc. and the Na-
tional Association of Independent Insurers, for the first time ever, the property and casu-
alty insurance industry in the United States reported a net loss for the nine months end-
ing on September 30, 2001. Press Release, Insurance Services Office, Inc. and the National
Association of Independent Insurers, First-Ever Nine-Month Net Loss for Prop-
erty/Casualty Industry in Wake of September 11 Attack and Deterioration in Investment
Results (Dec. 19, 2001), at http://www.iso.com/docs/pres260.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
The $3.1 billion aggregate net loss after taxes through September was attributed primar-
ily to the September 11 attacks and sharply contrasts with a net gain of $16.8 billion for
the same period in 2000. Id.
4. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") is an organization
comprised of the chief state insurance regulatory officials of the fifty states, the District of
Columbia, and several U.S. territories. For more information about the NAIC, see NAIC's
Web site at http://www.naic.org/lmisc/aboutnaiclabout/about01.htm (last visited Apr. 4,
2002).
5. Letter from Rep. Michael G. Oxley, Chairman, House Committee on Financial
Services, et al. to Kathleen Sebelius, President, National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners (Sept. 17, 2001), available at http://www.naic.org/lnews/releases/rel01/doc/
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ogy, the congressional letter went on to condemn "[alny attempt
to evade coverage obligations by either primary insurers or rein-
surers based on such legal maneuvering" as "unsupportable and
unpatriotic."6
The congressmen need not have worried. Soon after the terror-
ist attacks, a number of large insurers with much at stake in the
disaster issued public statements announcing their intentions not
to invoke war exclusions.' Had the insurers been inclined to do
so-negative public relations notwithstanding-they would not
likely have prevailed when challenged in court
This comment examines the intended function of war exclu-
sions in insurance policies and discusses judicial interpretations
of those exclusions in cases involving terrorist acts. It recounts
the events leading to the terrorism insurance crisis of 2001 and
the apparent resolution of that crisis. Finally, it suggests ways in
which the insurance industry may employ prior lessons learned
from the history of judicial interpretation of war exclusions to
avoid possible legal pitfalls that might otherwise negate the le-
gitimate and necessary purposes of terrorism exclusions.
0918011t.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
6. Id. (emphasis added).
7. See Lee Bergquist, NML to Honor All Attack Claims; Insurer Won't Cite 'Acts of
War' Exclusion, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 2001, at 1D (Northwestern Mutual
Life Insurance Company); Tamara Loomis, Crisis Management: Terrorist Actions Prompt
Laudable Responses, N.Y. LAW J., Sept. 20, 2001, at 5 (Chubb Corp., Swiss Re, and Hart-
ford Financial Services Group); Christopher Oster, Ace Joins Insurers That Won't Invoke
Act-of-War Clause, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2001, at B2 (Ace Ltd.); David Pilla, Life Insurers
Dismiss War Exclusion, BESTS INS. NEWS, Sept. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24724943
(MetLife Inc., Prudential Financial, and CIGNA).
8. See Scott Farley, Fitch Initial Review Is Complete, INS. DAY (London), Sept. 26,
2001, available at LEXIS, News Library, Insday File (commenting that "[any efforts to
invoke acts of war exclusions ... could backfire. Such action might reduce losses, but
would cause severe long-term damage to reputations and franchise values. .. ."); Loomis,
supra note 7, at 5 (discussing the necessity for tactfulness in public statements following
the disaster).
9. The leading case pertaining to war exclusions as applied to losses incurred as the
result of terrorist actions is Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974), in which a commercial plane was hijacked in mid-flight
by terrorists, taken to Egypt, and destroyed. In a lengthy opinion, the court surveyed and
summarized many of the earlier cases and held that the losses due to terrorism were not
excluded under any of the several war exclusions of the all-risk insurer. See id. at 1012-
15; see also discussion infra Parts llI.A., IV.C.
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II. INSURANCE AND THE RATIONALE FOR EXCLUDING COVERAGE
FOR LOSSES DUE TO WAR
A. What Makes Insurance Insurance
Fundamentally, insurance represents the delicate balance be-
tween the uncertainty and the predictability of future events as-
sociated with unfavorable consequences. ° Where there is no risk,
there can be no insurance, and arrangements not involving risk
which masquerade as insurance are more accurately understood
as entitlement programs." Nor can an insurance proposition op-
erate where the risk is real but inestimable. 2 To produce a mutu-
ally beneficial arrangement, the insurance bargain must relieve
one party of the burden of uncertainty associated with potential
losses, while allowing the other party to profit from their reason-
able calculability. 3
Insurance is of value to the purchaser only because it allows for
the sharing of risk across a pool of other similarly situated but
widely distributed purchasers, guaranteeing for each purchaser
protection against substantial but uncertain losses in exchange
for the payment of premiums both certain and manageable. 4 The
application of the "Law of Large Numbers" 5 allows insurers to
10. See Metro. Police Retiring Ass'n v. Tobriner, 306 F.2d 775, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
See generally ROBERT RIEGEL ET AL., INSURANCE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: PROPERTY
AND LIABILITY, chs. 1-2 (6th ed. 1976) (explaining fundamental principles of risk, risk
management, and the insurance mechanism).
11. See, e.g., Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 244-45 (D.C. Cir. 1939);
Mich. Hosp. Serv. v. Sharpe, 63 N.W.2d 638, 639 (Mich. 1954).
12. See RIEGEL ET AL., supra note 10, at 17.
13. See Epmeier v. United States, 199 F.2d 508, 509-10 (7th Cir. 1952).
14. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 652 P.2d 426, 428 (Cal. 1982);
RIEGEL ETAL., supra note 10, at 23.
15. The "Law of Large Numbers" is the statistical proposition that the more opportu-
nities exist for an event to occur, the closer the actual relationship of occurrences to oppor-
tunities will be to the true probability. LEWIS C. WORKMAN, THE MATHEMATICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF LIFE INSURANCE 121 (1982). Once the true probability is estimated by
observing a large sample of events, it must then be applied to a large number of exposures
before the actual occurrences will approximate the true probability. EMETT J. VAUGHAN
& THERESE M. VAUGHAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF RISK AND INSURANCE 25 (7th ed. 1996). Ex-
tremely catastrophic events are generally considered to be uninsurable in part because by
nature they fail to conform to models based on the Law of Large Numbers. RIEGEL ET AL.,
supra note 10, at 20-21. Past experience with events of such great magnitude is usually
too sparse to accurately predict how often a similar event can be expected to occur. Id.
Further, where a particular loss is grossly disproportionate to other losses that can be an-
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predict losses accurately enough to calculate premium rates,
which will not be prohibitively high, but which will nonetheless
produce reserves adequate to pay claims when and if the losses
insured against occur. 6 The cornerstone of the entire structure is
the application of actuarial probability principles using complex
statistical models based on data gathered from past experience.'
7
Discernment of a pattern that can be projected to forecast future
losses is the sine qua non which, if lacking, eliminates the possi-
bility of rational rate-setting. 8
B. The Uninsurable Nature of Losses Due to War and the Pattern
of Judicial Interpretation
War has for many years been recognized, both actuarially and
legally, as an uninsurable hazard.' 9 The actuarial rationales for
excluding coverage of losses due to war have not always been for-
tified, however, by judicial constructions of the policy language
used by insurers to effect the desired protection of their policy-
holder risk pools. In both life insurance and property and casu-
alty insurance-two of the hardest hit markets in the World
Trade Center disaster-some early judicial cases interpreting the
meaning of "war" were based on general prohibitions against en-
tering into illegal contracts. ° Since contracts which would "aid
ticipated to occur within the pool of policyholders, the catastrophic loss invalidates the cal-
culation of rates and has the potential to create insolvency for the insurer. Id. The device
of reinsurance, which will be discussed below, can mitigate some of the deleterious effects
of potentially catastrophic exposures. See discussion infra Part III.A.
16. RIEGEL ET AL., supra note 10, at 18-21.
17. See Jackie Spinner, Putting a Price on 'Wlhat Ifs. Actuaries Lack Figures to Fix
Premiums for Terrorism Insurance, WASH. POST, Oct. 24, 2001, at El (quoting John Pur-
ple, ChiefActuary at the Connecticut Department of Insurance, as commenting that "at its
simplest, a model multiplies the probability of an event happening by the probability of
how big it might be to determine the probable financial cost. The cost can then be trans-
lated into the price charged for insurance.").
18. RIEGEL ETAL., supra note 10, at 17-18.
19. See generally 1 ARTHUR BIDDLE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE § 487
(1893) (discussing the history and rationale for the war exclusion).
20. Id. § 487, at 440-41.
With regard to war, the rule is that citizens or subjects of one country cannot
trade with those of another at war with the former, without the license of the
King, President, or other legal authority... Therefore every insurance on
alien property must be understood not to cover property lost during hostili-
ties.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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the resources of the enemy" in time of war were forbidden,2' it be-
came necessary to pinpoint when a war had commenced. Those
early decisions established that the existence of a state of war
was a facts-and-circumstances determination rather than an is-
sue merely of whether or not war had been declared. One treatise
citing Civil War vintage decisions, for example, noted that "[t]o
create belligerent rights, it is not necessary that there should be
war between separate and independent powers, but.., they may
exist between parties to a civil war, and a state of war may exist
without any formal declaration of it by either side."22
The courts reined in this broad interpretation, however, when
they found it necessary to construe specific exclusions intended
by insurers to protect themselves and their policyholder pools
from adverse selection by life insurance applicants and from
catastrophic losses under property insurance policies.23 Condi-
tions resulting in non-random selection of risks (adverse selec-
tion) or in the possibility of grossly non-uniform maximum expo-
sures (catastrophic losses) interfere with the proper working of
the Law of Large Numbers in ways that can destabilize the finan-
cial condition of the insurer, and are therefore categorized as un-
insurable.24 While not contesting the logic of the insurers' objec-
tives in excluding war risks, courts have insisted upon precision
in contract terms in order to prevent unfair claim denials. In de-
ciding such cases, courts have consistently invoked the doctrine of
contra proferentem-that ambiguities in contract language, espe-
21. Id. § 490, at 445.
22. Id. § 492, at 446 (citing The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1862); Robinson v. Int'l Life
Assurance Soc'y, 42 N.Y. 54 (1870)).
23. Adverse selection is the phenomenon by which those most likely to incur losses
tend to purchase and retain insurance coverage and those least likely to incur losses tend
to refrain from purchasing coverage, thus skewing the probability of losses away from
normal expected values that would result given random selection by the general popula-
tion. See generally VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra note 15, at 28-29. War exclusions address
the issue by recognizing the tendency of those likely to be called to military service to ob-
tain life insurance protection with more frequency than others, and by eliminating the ad-
ditional hazard created by that adverse selection while still allowing the applicants the
availability of life insurance. See WILLIAM F. MEYER, LIFE AND HEALTH INSURANCE LAW §
7.6, at 205-06 (1972).
24. See RIEGEL ET AL., supra note 10, at 20; Spinner, supra note 17, at E5 (quoting
Laureen Regan, Associate Professor of Risk Management and Insurance at Temple Uni-
versity, as commenting that "[wihen you can't rely on things happening by accident, the
entire pricing process falls apart .... We have to be able to estimate how often this will
happen.").
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cially in contracts of adhesion25 such as insurance policies, must
be construed strictly against the drafter and liberally in favor of
the policyholder.26
In Welts v. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co.,27 for exam-
ple, the court interpreted insurance policy language restricting
the insured person from entering into "any military or naval ser-
vice whatsoever"2' and excluding death "from any of the casual-
ties or consequences of war or rebellion, or from belligerent forces
in any place where he may be."2 9 The insured was shot and killed
while employed by the government of the United States, supervis-
ing the building of railroad bridges to be used by the Union Army
for military purposes during the Civil War. ° Though his assail-
ants demanded first to know whether anyone there "wore a fed-
eral uniform," there was no evidence that they were Confederate
soldiers or were acting under Confederate authority.3' The court,
noting that "[t]he company frame[s] the policy and choose[s] the
language" and that any uncertainty in the policy's terms should
therefore be resolved in favor of the insured, held that "[t]he gen-
eral understanding of the term [military service] includes such
persons only as are liable to do duty in the field as combatants." 2
The court further held that "[t]he language used can be consid-
ered as including only death from casualties or consequences of
war or rebellion, carried on or waged by authority of some de
facto government, at least."33
Quite possibly, as would have been consistent with the justifi-
cation for the exclusion, the insurer's intent was to exclude
25. A contract of adhesion is defined as "[a] standard-form contract prepared by one
party, to be signed by the party in a weaker position, [usually] a consumer, who has little
choice about the terms." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 318-19 (7th ed. 1999). For cases treat-
ing insurance policies as contracts of adhesion, see, e.g., Healy Tibbits Constr. Co. v. Em-
ployers' Surplus Lines Ins. Co., 140 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977); Princeton
Ins. Co. v. Chunmuang, 698 A.2d 9, 12 (N.J. 1997).
26. See, e.g., Schmutz v. Employees' Fire Ins. Co., 76 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1935); Al-
britton v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 70 So. 2d 111, 113 (La. 1953); Raska v. Farm Bureau
Mut. Ins. Co., 314 N.W.2d 440, 441 (Mich. 1982); Hoffman & Place v. Aetna Fire Ins. Co.,
32 N.Y. 405, 411 (1865); Buckeye Union Ins. Co. v. Price, 313 N.E.2d 844, 846 (Ohio 1974).
27. 48 N.Y. 34 (1871).
28. Id. at 38.
29. Id.
30. Id.
3L Id. at 39.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 40.
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deaths resulting in any way from activity in furtherance of the
war effort, which might subject the insured to significantly in-
creased mortality risk. Yet, if that was the intent, the language
failed to convey it clearly. The court found the exclusion to be
ambiguously worded, and therefore construed it against the in-
surer, thus endowing the terms "military service" and "war," as
used in insurance policies, with legal meanings that would
thenceforth guide courts in construing war risk exclusions 3 - -
meanings distinct from and possibly contrary to those intended
by the insurers who initially used the terms.
Welts illustrates the pattern that accounts for much of the di-
vergence in modern cases involving terrorism, between the actu-
arial impetus for the war exclusion and its judicially bounded op-
eration. Where a terrorist act reproduces the conditions of
uninsurability associated with traditional warfare, a determina-
tion as to whether the event was or was not "carried on or waged
by authority of some de facto government"35 (or the present-day
equivalent determination of whether or not the entity possessed
"at least significant attributes of sovereignty"36) is a judicial exer-
cise that bears only the most attenuated relationship to a deter-
mination of whether the event ought or ought not be deemed in-
surable. Nevertheless, prevailing case law wrought by the
reiterative interpretations of courts applying contra proferentem
to generations of insurance policy exclusions has refined the legal
meaning of war and related terms for insurance purposes to the
extent that it is now generally anticipated that war exclusions
will not be held to function effectively to exclude terrorist acts."
34. The interpretations of these terms by the Welts court retain their vitality today.
For example, the case was cited for its interpretation of "war" in Pan American World
Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 505 F.2d 989, 1013 (2d Cir. 1974), the lead-
ing modern case interpreting terms used in typical war exclusions. The comprehensive in-
surance law treatise, COUCH ON INSURANCE, cites Welts for its interpretation of "military
service" in discussing the treatment of civilians under war exclusions. 10 LEE R. Russ,
COUCH ON INSURANCE § 143:45 (3d ed. 1998).
35. Welts, 48 N.Y. at 40.
36. See Pan Am, 505 F.2d at 1012.
37. Although there is little case law directly on point as to the inefficacy of war exclu-
sions relative to modern terrorist acts, an exception is Pan Am, discussed infra at Parts
III.A, IV.C. The opinion extensively catalogs and examines the terms commonly used in
war exclusions in the context of a terrorist hijacking, establishing persuasive precedent
that seems likely to weigh heavily in the analysis of any court called upon to consider in-
surance exclusions invoked in denials of claims resulting from the events of September 11,
2001. A more recent case, Holiday Inns, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co., 571 F. Supp. 1460
THE INCALCULABLE RISK
III. INADEQUATE PROTECTION AND THE POST-SEPTEMBER 11
INSURANCE CRISIS
A. Industry Unreadiness and the Role of Reinsurance
Prior to September 11, 2001, the insurance industry failed to
recognize and adjust to the dual realities that exposure from ter-
rorist actions could be so financially devastating as to undermine
the entire insurance system and that the industry's standard pol-
icy exclusions utterly failed to protect it from exposures of such
enormous magnitude." A wake-up call might have come as early
as 1974, when the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided
Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), cites Pan Am heavily in its rejection of an insurer's attempt to character-
ize the destruction of a hotel in Lebanon due to fighting between Christian and Moslem
militia groups as the result of "war."
38. John T. Sinnott, Chairman and CEO of Marsh, Inc. explained as follows:
The problem with what happened on September 11 is that it presented a
risk that no one could conceive would happen. When the buildings were built,
loss scenarios did contemplate the impact of one Boeing 707 (the largest
commercial aircraft at the time), however the idea of two, fully fueled 767s
hitting both towers was unimaginable.
Terror Insurance Availability: Hearing on Terrorism Insurance Before the Senate Comm.
on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong. (2001) [hereinafter Senate Hearing]
(statement of John T. Sinnott, Chairman and CEO, Marsh, Inc.), 2001 WL 26187268. See
also Blackest Day as Insurers Fear for Staff, INS. DAY (London), Sept. 12, 2001, at 1 ("The
unprecedented events of yesterday are generally not even found in the 'worst case scenar-
ios' run by some firms."), available at LEXIS, News Library, Insday File; Richard A. Fogel,
Sept. 11: Risk Management Lessons Learned, N.Y. LAW J., Nov. 2, 2001, at 1, 6 ("Most
commercial property insurance policies contain a standard war risk exclusion. Cases in-
terpreting this exclusion, mostly as a result of litigation ensuing from the 1993 attack on
the Twin Towers, limits its applicability."); Jon L. Gelman & Lewis L. Heller, World Trade
Center Tragedy Creates Complex Workers' Compensation Issues, N.J. L.J., Oct. 8, 2001, at
108 ("Horrible and catastrophic events such as occurred on Sept. 11, 2001, were never con-
templated in the legislative crafting of our nation's social, remedial insurance paradigm.");
Christopher A. Jennings, Where Do We Go from Here? War Risk Exclusion Clauses and
"Acts of War" by Non-Sovereign Entities, FED. LAW., Nov.-Dec. 2001, at 60, 64 ("Surpris-
ingly, even after the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center, insurers continued to in-
clude risks arising from acts of terrorism in the basket of insurable risks under traditional
all-risk insurance policies."); Spinner, supra note 17, at El (quoting John Purple, chief ac-
tuary at the Connecticut Department of Insurance, as commenting that "[w]e model for
catastrophes, but my guess is nobody ever modeled for a 767 full of fuel crashing into the
World Trade Center. I doubt that anyone ever thought that was a possibility."); Walter
Updegrave, How Strong Is the Safety Net?, MONEY, Nov. 2001, at 130, 134-35 ("Many [in-
surers] routinely run an RDS (realistic disaster scenario), such as two jumbo jets colliding
over a large city or a major earthquake hitting Los Angeles, to determine their PML
(probable maximum liability). But no one envisioned a catastrophe like the one that oc-
curred on Sept. 11.").
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Co.39 The industry's failure to respond adequately to a strong ad-
monition by the court in that case, even after the 1993 bombing of
the World Trade Center provided a preview of the disaster that
ultimately occurred, is at least in part attributable to the false
sense of security created by the widespread use of reinsurance in
providing coverage for potentially catastrophic losses.
In Pan Am, the court was called upon to construe a number of
all-risk policy exclusions in connection with the terrorist hijack-
ing of a United States airliner by members of the Popular Front
for the Liberation of Palestine, who forced the plane's crew to fly
the plane to Egypt, where the plane was destroyed with explo-
sives.4 ° In holding that the losses resulting from the terrorist ac-
tion were covered under the terms of the policy, notwithstanding
exclusions pertaining inter alia to war, warlike operations, mili-
tary or usurped power, insurrection, riot, and civil commotion,4
the court forcefully emphasized that if the general rule is that
ambiguous insurance policy terms are to be construed strictly
against the insurer, then a fortiori, the doctrine of contra profer-
entem demands such interpretation when the insurer knew its
exclusions were ambiguous and failed to clarify them accord-
ingly.42 Citing evidence that the risk of hijacking was well known
to the insurers and that, moreover, the insurers were aware that
their policy exclusions were ambiguous, the court concluded that
"[w]hen the all risk insurers failed to exclude 'political risks in
words descriptive of today's world events,' they acted at their own
peril."43
Given this judicial road-map provided by the Pan Am court and
the geometric progression in the capacity for mass destruction by
terrorists in the last decade,' the fact that there remained, in
39. 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. Id. at 993.
41. Id. at 994.
42. Id. at 999.
43. Id. at 999-1001 (citations omitted).
44. See Senate Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Robert E. Vagley, President,
American Insurance Association) (quoting Warren Buffet, CEO of Berkshire-Hathaway,
one of the world's largest reinsurers, as stating that "[tierrorism today is not at all like
terrorism of 25 years ago.... [Tihe power to inflict damage has gone up a factor of-who
knows what-10, 50 ... you can't price for that."), 2001 WL 26187266; Arthur H. Garri-
son, How the World Changed: A History of the Development of Terrorism, Address at the
Delaware Criminal Justice Council (Oct. 28-29, 2001) (describing the progressive evolu-
tion of terrorist activity during the 1990s toward actions aimed at mass destruction for its
THE INCALCULABLE RISK
2001, numerous insurance policies lacking detailed, explicit, and
comprehensive terrorism exclusions would seem inexplicable but
for certain industry practices that met instant obsolescence in the
aftermath of September 11. One of the most significant of these
was the prevalence of, and reliance on, reinsurance as a device
used by insurers for spreading the risk of potentially catastrophic
losses, such as those due to terrorism, that might exceed the
amount which could be withstood solely on the basis of the insur-
ers' own financial capacities.
Reinsurance is a market mechanism that allows insurers to ac-
cept more risk than would otherwise be permitted by regulators
monitoring their financial solvency.45 Through a reinsurance
agreement (or "treaty"), an insurance company that directly pro-
vides coverage to policyholders (a "primary writer") transfers (or
"cedes") a portion of its risk to a reinsurance company, which may
in turn transfer portions, through "retrocession," to other compa-
nies.46 Each insurer in the chain thus limits, at least in theory,
the liability it retains to a specified dollar amount or percentage
of the total potential loss.4' In financial reporting, the insurer is
allowed to offset its claim liabilities by amounts it expects to re-
ceive from its reinsurers, provided the reinsurers' financial condi-
tion is acceptable to regulators in the primary writer's domiciliary
state. 8
Although reinsurance ordinarily functions beneficially for both
insurers and policyholders by increasing the overall capacity of
the market, stabilizing insurers' profits, and allowing for the ac-
quisition of coverage on large risks without the necessity of nego-
tiation with multiple insurers,49 the World Trade Center disaster
own sake, fueled by hatred for the West and America and religious extremist thought, and
marked by characteristics of "asymmetric warfare"), available at http://vww.state.de.us/
cjc/history.ppt (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
45. See generally Jonathan F. Bank & Lance A. Warrick, The Regulation of Reinsur-
ance, in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, THE STATE OF INSURANCE REGULATION 127, 137-46
(Francine L. Semaya & Vincent J. Vitkowsky eds., 1991); VAUGHAN & VAUGHAN, supra
note 15, at 150-52.
46. RIEGEL ETAL., supra note 10, at 120; Updegrave, supra note 38, at 135.
47. See RIEGEL ETAL., supra note 10, at 120.
48. See Bank & Warrick, supra note 45, at 137-46; Alice Schroeder et al., Reinsurance
Recoverables-The Lake Wobegon Problem, in INSURANCE-PROPERTY-CASUALTY: WORLD
TRADE CENTER SPECIAL ISSUE (Morgan Stanley Dean Witter & Co., New York, N.Y.), Sept.
17, 2001, at 4.
49. RIEGELETAL., supra note 10, at 121-26.
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has brought into sharp focus a major drawback of this arrange-
ment that can, in certain situations known as "clash events," re-
sult in a breakdown of the system."° In a clash event, an occur-
rence, often unanticipated or unpredictable but of catastrophic
proportions, concentrates significant losses across multiple lines
of insurance simultaneously. 1 The World Trade Center disaster,
by far the most catastrophic clash event in insurance history, is
generating claims in aviation, property, liability, life, workers'
compensation, business interruption, health, disability, automo-
bile, and other miscellaneous lines of insurance, all centralized
within one concentrated area. 2 Where the complex, overlapping
reinsurance arrangements of the primary writers of these cover-
ages resulted in reinsurers being exposed to catastrophic losses
across multiple lines of insurance, companies that in ordinary cir-
cumstances would have benefited by diversifying across product
lines may instead find themselves over-leveraged and insolvent.53
Additionally, the retrocession arrangements behind policies
providing benefits as large as those now payable due to World
Trade Center losses are often multi-layered, involving extensive
chains of insurers.54 This practice creates further complex inter-
dependencies and even more opportunities for reinsurer failures
in clash events where reinsurers who are party to numerous ret-
rocession agreements incur compound losses.5
When the dust settles after a catastrophic clash event and the
losses are finally quantified, if any reinsurers have failed-and at
50. See Tom Condon, Insuring Insurers; Little-Known Reinsurance Companies Play
Big Roles in Spreading Out Huge Risk, HARTFORD COuRANT, Oct. 9, 2001, at El; Joseph
G. Finnerty III & Eric S. Connuck, Sept. 11: What Is the Impact on the Insurers?, N.Y. LAW
J., Nov. 26, 2001, at 1; Douglas McLeod, Insurers Shaken But Solvent--So Far, Bus. INS.,
Oct. 1, 2001, at 1; Schroeder, supra note 48, at 4; Updegrave, supra note 38, at 132.
51. See McLeod, supra note 50, at 1.
52. See Gary Thompson, Insurance for Losses Resulting from the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001, 12 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: REINSURANCE No. 11, at 21 (Oct. 4, 2001);
Updegrave, supra note 38, at 132-33.
53. See Finnerty & Connuck, supra note 50, at 6 ("A 'clash event' of the magnitude of
Sept. 11 contradicts the actuarial assumptions relied upon by reinsurers when they diver-
sify risks in this manner."); Schroeder, supra note 48, at 4.
54. See Updegrave, supra note 38, at 135 ("When large policies are involved--such as
many in the World Trade Center incident-it's not uncommon to see a chain of twenty or
more insurers.").
55. See Christopher Oster, Lloyd's Faces Challenge Following Attack on Twin Towers,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2001, at A4; David Pilla, Tillinghast Says WTC Disaster May Hit
$58 Billion, BEST'S INS. NEWS, Sept. 24, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24724985.
THE INCALCULABLE RISK
least one industry analyst has placed the probability that some
reinsurers will fail due to the World Trade Center event at close
to one hundred percent 56-the primary writers, still contractually
bound to pay the full policy benefits to policyholders regardless of
background reinsurance arrangements, are forced to make up the
difference.5"
B. The Terrorism Insurance Crisis and Its Outcome
As noted by insurers and financial analysts, the unprecedented
magnitude and severity of the disaster that occurred on Septem-
ber 11, 2001, did not change the probability that another disaster
of unimaginable proportions could occur at any time.5" It was that
eventuality, even more than that which had already occurred,
that caused the breakdown of certain market mechanisms for
providing terrorism-risk insurance and resulted in fundamental
changes in insurance and reinsurance practices.59 Industry un-
readiness, disadvantageous aspects of the insurance and reinsur-
ance regulatory scheme in the United States, and unfortunate
timing each played a role in the accelerated sequence of events
that culminated in the virtual elimination of terrorism coverage
by insurers in the United States.
Having failed, for the most part, to implement explicit terror-
ism exclusions because of factors such as the competitiveness of
the market, the perception of adequate protection created by
complex ceding and retrocession arrangements, and the failure of
actuarial worst-case maximum liability models to contemplate a
56. Schroeder, supra note 48, at 5.
57. Finnerty & Connuck, supra note 50, at 6.
58. See Senate Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Walter _ Knorr, Chief Financial
Officer, City of Chicago) (testifying that the City of Chicago had been presented with a
"premium increase of over 5,000 percent" to renew its insurance, including substantially
less terrorism coverage for O'Hare and Midway airports); Adrian Ladbury, Life After Sept.
11: No Capacity Crisis, INS. DAY (London), Oct. 9, 2001, at 1 (quoting Ruud Bosman, Ex-
ecutive Vice President of global property insurer FM Global), available at LEXIS, News
Library, Insday File.
59. See Dawn Kopecki, Congress Mulls Insurer Aid as Rates for Some Jump 5,000%,
CAPITAL MURKETs REP., Oct. 25, 2001 (quoting Ronald E. Ferguson, Chairman of General
Re Corp., one of the four largest reinsurers in the world, while testifying before the Senate
Banking Committee, as commenting, "I don't think we'll ever get back to the way we were
before Sept. 11.... The question becomes, how many Sept. llths can we take? And the
answer is, this one."), available at WL 10/25/01 Cap. Mkt. Rep. 15:12:00.
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terrorism-generated clash event of such gigantic proportions, °
most insurers and reinsurers had only war-risk exclusions to fall
back on at the time the World Trade Center was destroyed. As-
sessing the negative public relations consequences and the per-
ceived unlikelihood of withstanding legal challenges that might
follow from an attempted invocation of these exclusions in con-
nection with September 11 losses, insurers and their global rein-
surers made the decision to refrain from invoking war risk exclu-
sions and to treat the losses as covered."' They did so irrespective
of the possibility that some war exclusions might have been found
applicable, even under the intense scrutiny of courts applying
contra proferentem, given that the events of September 11 were
unique and distinguishable from prior terrorist activities in a
number of ways.62 Nevertheless, insurers agreed to provide bene-
fits for losses under the existing policies, thereby waiving any ap-
plication of war exclusions." In so doing, however, they did not
foreclose the possibility of excluding such losses in the future.64
60. See Senate Hearing, supra note 38 (statement of Ron E. Ferguson, Chairman,
General Re Corporation) ("Before September 11 the threat of terrorism within our borders
seemed remote. Because of that, no insurance or reinsurance premiums were collected for
terrorism coverages, and no assets or reserves were allocated to terrorism exposures.").
61. See sources cited supra notes 7-8.
62. See Senate Hearing, supra note 38 (testimony of Robert E. Vagley, President,
American Insurance Association) ("We have not attempted to invoke war exclusions, de-
spite the militaristic nature of, and rhetoric surrounding, the attacks."); Randy J.
Maniloff, The War Risk Exclusion-Looking Beyond the Events of September 11th, 13
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: INS. INSOLVENCY No. 9, at 21 (Oct. 11, 2001).
[A] review of [Pan American World Airways, Inc., v. Aetna Casualty & Surety
Co., 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974)A leaves no doubt that the question whether
the "war risk" exclusion would apply to claims arising out of the recent at-
tacks in New York and Washington is by no means as cut and dry as the im-
pression one gets from reading the media reports that have simply cited [the
case] and dismissed the issue out of hand.
Id.
The author identifies, inter alia, the possibility that there was sponsorship of the at-
tacks by a state or other "sovereignty," the declaration by bin Laden of a "jihad" or holy
war against the United States, and the fact that Congress authorized the use of force in
response pursuant to the War Powers Resolution as distinguishing features of the events
of September 11, 2001, that might have influenced judicial construction of particular war-
risk exclusions in favor of insurers. See also Alexander Nicoll, US Advised to Concentrate
on Victory, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at 2. (commenting that "[tihe US has a newly de-
fined enemy which is... international terrorism and terrorist-sponsored states") (empha-
sis added); Rod Norland et al., War on Terror, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 17, 2001, at 22 (discussing
the terrorist "colonization" and "hijacking" of Afghanistan).
63. See sources cited supra note 7.
64. See, e.g., Chubb CEO Says Industry is Strong, Warns of Unavailability of Future
Terrorism Coverage, 11 INS. COVERAGE LITIG. REP. (Andrews Publ'ns, Inc.) No. 44, at 989
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On the contrary, reinsurers pointedly reserved the right to ex-
clude terrorism-related losses explicitly, as a matter of financial
survival.65
A consensus quickly emerged among reinsurers that while the
industry could survive the huge losses generated by the Septem-
ber 11 disaster, it could not absorb another shock of that magni-
tude in the near term.6 6 In late September, the industry turned to
Congress for intervention, proposing the creation of a federally-
managed terrorism reinsurance pool modeled after the British
system known as "Pool Re."67 With seventy percent of the rein-
surance agreements overlaying property insurance policies in the
United States scheduled for renewal on January 1, 2002, reinsur-
ers could not afford to delay taking action to revise their agree-
ment terms so as to exclude terrorism coverage under renewing
contracts.6" Large reinsurers began announcing their intention to
(Oct. 5, 2001) (reporting warning of the chairman and chief executive officer of reinsurer
Chubb Corp. that a series of terrorist attacks could threaten the solvency of the insurance
industry), available at LEXIS, Insurance Library, Andrews File; NAIC Backs Federal Role
on Terror Re, INS. CHRON., Oct. 29, 2001, at 1 (quoting David Mathis, Chief Executive Of-
ficer of Kemper Insurance Co., as telling the National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners that "[r]einsurers have already notified Kemper... that they intend to exclude or
dramatically scale back terrorism coverage in contracts up for renewal.... [We recognize
that this may be the only way to protect their solvency."), [hereinafter NA!C Backs] avail-
able at LEXIS, News Library, Allnews File; Douglas Quenqua, Insurers Act to Protect
Against Attacks, PR WEEK, Nov. 2, 2001, at 6 (quoting Edward Morgan, Senior Vice Presi-
dent and Communications Officer of the Hartford Insurance Group as stating "Our pri-
mary message is that this industry has finite resources, and terrorism is something you
can't predict, so the re-insurance markets can't protect it."), available at LEXIS, News Li-
brary, Allnews File.
65. See NAIC Backs, supra note 64.
66. See id; see also America's Insurance Industry: Keeping the Promise: Hearing on the
Impact of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on America's Insurance System Before
the House Comm. on Financial Services, 107th Cong. 25 (2001) [hereinafter House Hear-
ing] (testimony of Kathleen Sebelius, President, National Association of Insurance Com-
missioners) ("We know the insurance industry cannot withstand multiple events of this
magnitude without harm to all consumers."), available at http://www.house.gov/ finan-
cialservices/107-45.pdf (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
67. For testimony of the insurance industry before Congress, see generally Senate
Hearing, supra note 38, and House Hearing, supra note 66. "Pool Re" is the Pool Reinsur-
ance Company, a mutual reinsurance company established by the British government as a
mechanism for providing coverage of losses due to terrorism. For an in-depth description
and analysis of Pool Re, see generally William B. Bice, Comment, British Government Re-
insurance and Acts of Terrorism: The Problems of Pool Re, 15 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 441
(1994).
68. Senate Hearing, supra note 38 (testimony of Robert E. Vagley, President, Ameri-
can Insurance Association) ("[MIlore than two-thirds of annual reinsurance con-
tracts-agreements by which primary insurance companies purchase their own insurance
to adequately spread the risk of large-scale losses-are renewed each January 1."); Mike
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exclude all such coverage, while continuing to press for federal
assistance.69
Reinsurers were able to revise their agreement terms, despite
the consternation of Congress and state insurance regulators, be-
cause of the absence of state filing and approval requirements for
reinsurance contract terms.7 ° Whereas state regulatory agencies
exercise veto power over the specific terms of insurance policies
intended for issuance to consumers by direct writers, they exer-
cise little power over the terms of reinsurance treaties as a mat-
ter of longstanding practice.7' Although state regulators closely
monitor the solvency of reinsurers,72 their traditional willingness
to allow flexibility in the terms of reinsurance treaties reflects a
recognition that such agreements memorialize complex, negoti-
ated financial arrangements between knowledgeable, sophisti-
cated parties. Treaties are not amenable to standard terms; in-
stead, they are customized to meet the unique needs and
circumstances of particular insurers and their specific books of
business."
Since filing and approval of reinsurance contracts were not re-
quired, reinsurers were free to announce changes prior to renew-
ing agreements with ceding primary writers for 2002, leaving the
McNamee, Terror Insurance: How to Stop the Coming Crisis, BUS. WK., Dec. 10, 2001, at
36; Christopher Oster & Michael Schroeder, Carriers Plan Lower-Cost Terror-Insurance
Pool, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2001, at A10.
69. See, e.g., Michael Schroeder, Senate Panel Is Set to Offer Bill to Back Terrorism
Insurance, WALL ST. J., Oct. 26, 2001, at A4 (reporting that Zurich Financial Services' Zu-
rich Global Energy, insurer for oil, gas, mining, and power-generating companies, had an-
nounced to clients that it would not renew terrorism coverage on property policies).
70. See 14 ERic MILLS HOLMES & L. ANTHONY SUTIN, HoLMEs's APPLEMAN ON
INSURANCE 2D § 103.1, at 77 (2000).
71. See id.
72. Bank & Warrick, supra note 48, at 137-46.
73. See Terrorism Risk, The Role of the Federal Government in Assuring That Insur-
ance for Terrorist Acts Remains Available to Consumers: Hearing Before the Senate Comm.
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Diane
Koken, Pa. Insurance Commissioner, testifying on behalf of the NAIC), available at 2001
WL 26187327.
These are considered to be the product of free market negotiations among so-
phisticated insurance underwriters, brokers, and professional corporate risk
managers who rely upon the traditional powers of buyers and sellers to bar-
gain for the best deal they can get. The state regulatory interest in such large
transactions is mainly that they not impair the overall financial health of an
insurer, since monitoring insurer solvency is a major responsibility of the
regulators.
Id. See also HOLMES & SUTIN, supra note 70.
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primary insurers without coverage for their excess risks attribut-
able to terrorism.' The primary writers, however, could not in
turn revise their contracts with policyholders, because they re-
quired approval by reluctant state regulators. 5 Mindful of the
need for businesses to protect against losses due to terrorism, the
regulators hesitated to allow direct insurers to file and obtain ap-
proval of terrorism exclusions. 6
The NAIC, representing state insurance regulators who gener-
ally favor the preservation of the traditional role of the states in
regulating the business of insurance,7 initially opposed proposals
for federal intervention, fearing that a federal terrorism reinsur-
ance pool would "supplant the private market."' As reinsurers
began to pull out, however, the NAIC joined the industry in sup-
porting federal intervention to create an alternative mechanism,
in recognition of the untenable position of the primary writers
74. See Diane Brady & Mike McNamee, Give Insurers a Break-But Not a Free Ride,
BUS. WK., Oct. 29, 2001, at 38.
States, which regulate the industry, require underwriters to provide terror-
ism coverage, and will likely continue to do so. But the industry contends
that it has no choice but to either forgo offering such coverage to businesses it
considers an undue risk, or charge such exorbitant rates as to be prohibitive.
The reason: reinsurance companies, which back up their policies, say they'll
cut off terror insurance on Jan. 1, when trillions of dollars in policies expire.
That could prompt underwriters to balk at writing policies altogether because
they don't want to be left holding the bag. With no coverage, lenders won't
lend, builders won't build, and business will grind to a halt.
Id.
75. Senate Hearing, supra note 38 (testimony of Robert E. Vagley, President, Ameri-
can Insurance Association).
Primary carriers, however, do not have the same flexibility as reinsurers with
respect to our own products because we are subject to tighter regulatory con-
trols. Any terrorism exclusions we might choose to introduce must be ap-
proved by individual state insurance departments.... [I1f exclusions were
not approved, primary insurers would be left to shoulder 100 percent of fu-
ture terrorist losses, which we simply cannot afford to do. Our only remaining
option-one we would prefer not to consider-would be to simply withdraw
from certain markets, and/or lines of coverage.
Id.
76. See Press Release, NAIC, NAIC Urges Final Action on Terrorism Insurance Liti-
gation (Dec. 17, 2001), at http://wvv.naic.org/l news/releasesrelOl/121701_errorism.htm
(last visited Apr. 4, 2002) (quoting December 14, 2001 letter from Terri Vaughan, Presi-
dent of the NAIC, to Senators Thomas Daschle and Trent Lott).
77. See generally EMERIC FISCHER & PETER NASH SWISHER, PRINCIPLES OF
INSURANCE LAW § 7.01 (2d ed. 1994).
78. Arthur D. Postal, Despite Terrorism 'Crisis, P/C Reinsurance Pool Will Be Tough
Sell on Capitol Hill, INS. ACCT., Oct. 1, 2001, at 1 (quoting Kathleen Sebelius, Chairman of
the NAIC), available at 2001 WL 2524499.
20021
586 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:569
and the threat to their solvency presented by potential terrorism
losses absent a federal "backstop."79 On October 24, the organiza-
tion adopted the following resolution:
Reinsurers are notifying their customers that they will no longer
cover terrorism risk, and primary carriers are notifying state insur-
ance regulators that they intend to seek exclusions of terrorism cov-
erage in their contracts with policyholders. This lack of availability
will have a severe adverse effect on our country's economy if, for ex-
ample, lenders are unwilling to make loans without terrorism cover-
age.
We, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, there-
fore pledge to work with the Congress and the White House and with
other interested parties and take action as soon as possible to ad-
dress this critical issue.80
Rejecting the industry's proposal for a federal reinsurance pool,
the Bush administration proposed a plan in which the govern-
ment would assume most terrorism losses during 2002, in order
to give the industry time to recover from its September 11 losses,
before gradually resuming responsibility for the full risk associ-
ated with providing terrorism coverage by the expiration of the
program at the end of three years.8 ' Both the House Financial
Services Committee and the Senate Banking Committee held
hearings on the subject in late October, followed by the introduc-
tion in the House on November 1, 2001, of the Terrorism Risk
Protection Act,8 2 a temporary program that would have provided
financial assistance to property and casualty insurers in the form
of loans." Although the House passed its bill on November 29, the
79. See NAIC Backs, supra note 64.
80. Press Release, NAIC, Members Adopt Resolution Regarding Availability of Terror-
ism Coverage (Oct. 24, 2001), at http://www.naic.orgflnewsreleases/relOl/102401mm
brsadoptrsltnregardavlbltyterrcov.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002).
81. Under the administration's proposal, the government would have initially paid
eighty percent of the first $20 billion in terrorism-related insurance claims and ninety per-
cent thereafter, with the government's contribution gradually decreasing over the three-
year period. See Terrorism Risk Insurance: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Capital
Markets, Ins., and Gov't Sponsored Enters., 107th Cong. 5 (2001) (statement of Paul H.
O'Neill, Secretary of the Treasury), 2001 WL 26187520.
82. H.R. 3210, 107th Cong. (2001).
83. The House measure would have created a temporary program by which financial
assistance in the form of loans up to an aggregate total of $20 billion would be provided to
property and casualty insurers affected by a triggering terrorist event, ninety percent of
which would subsequently be repaid by the insurers in accordance with assessments
capped at three percent of each insurer's aggregate written premium in any given year. Id.
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Senate became embroiled in a partisan dispute over an attached
tort-reform measure barring punitive damages in lawsuits arising
from terrorist attacks, and failed to reach agreement before ad-
journing on December 20, 2001.'
As Congress neared adjournment and it became less and less
likely that federal safeguards would be in place soon enough to
benefit insurers facing the year-end expiration of their reinsur-
ance agreements, state regulators began to acknowledge that
they would have no choice but to approve terrorism exclusions
filed by primary insurers." The NAIC took the step of adopting a
definition of "act of terrorism" to be used as a guide for insurers
who would file exclusions, 6 and when Congress adjourned with-
out enacting federal legislation, the NAIC announced that
"[gliven Congress' failure to act, regulators will begin allowing in-
surers to exclude terrorism losses if a terrorist act causes total in-
sured losses exceeding $25 million.""7 As a result, barring further
federal legislative developments that could convince reinsurers to
re-enter the terrorism insurance market and cause regulators to
The text of H.R. 3210 is available on the Internet at the Library of Congress's federal leg-
islative information system found at http'//thomas.loc.gov.
84. See Today's Debate: Terrorism Insurance, As Clock Ticks, Congress Sits on Quick
Terror-Insurance Fix, USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 2001, at A16 ("The House leadership attached
the liability protection to its otherwise worthwhile terrorism insurance bill that passed
last week. Meanwhile, in the Senate, Republicans say no bill will pass without it, virtually
guaranteeing gridlock with Democrats who oppose it."); Jackie Spinner, Congress Unable
to Pass Terror Insurance Bill: Deadlock Ends Hope for Quick Action on Issue, WASH. POST,
Dec. 21, 2001, at El.
85. On December 18, 2001, new NAIC President Terri Vaughan stated that "[tihere is
strong consensus among NAIC members that if Congress doesn't act, state insurance regu-
lators will be left with no choice but to begin approving some exclusions for commercial
lines." Press Release, NAIC, NAIC Members Make Decision Regarding Terrorism Insur-
ance (Dec. 18, 2001), at http/-www.naic.org/lnews/releases/rel0l/index.htm (last visited
Apr. 4, 2002).
86. Dennis Kelly, Regulators Adopt Definition of Terrorist Act, BESVS INS. NEWS, Dec.
11, 2001, available at 2001 WL 24726087.
87. Press Release, NAIC, NAIC Members Come to Agreement Regarding Exclusions
for Acts of Terrorism (Dec. 21, 2001) at http'//www.nalc.org/lnews/releases/
relOl/index.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2002). According to the Insurance Services Office, Inc.
("ISO"), drafter of the NAIC-endorsed exclusion, the $25 million threshold (commonly used
in the property and casualty insurance business to identify a catastrophic loss) would not
apply where terrorist acts involve the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological materials.
Press Release, ISO, ISO Gratified by Insurance Regulators' Call for Approval of Terrorism
Exclusions; Wording Free to Non-Customers (Dec. 21, 2001), at http://www.iso.com/docs/
pres262.htm (last visited Apr. 4,2002); see also Hard Hit at the World Trade Center: At the
Top of a Terrible List, BuS. WK., Sept. 24, 2001, at 12 (listing insured losses from some
man-made disasters of the last decade, including the 1993 World Trade Center bombing
($510 million) and the Oklahoma City bombing ($125 million)).
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withdraw their approvals, explicit terrorism exclusions will now
become ubiquitous across all lines of insurance that could be ad-
versely affected by terrorist attacks like those of September 11,
2001.
IV. LESSONS LEARNED: AVOIDING THE PITFALLS OF CONTRA
PROFERENTEM
A. The Need for Unambiguous, Plain-English Terminology
Now that the World Trade Center disaster and the insurance
crisis it generated have demonstrated, in no uncertain terms, the
uninsurability of catastrophic acts of terrorism, insurers face the
challenge of drafting and implementing exclusionary policy terms
that state regulators will approve, yet will withstand judicial
scrutiny. Case law attests to the dangers of ambiguity, in terms of
both decisions adverse to particular insurers and of judicially pre-
cedential constructions contrary to insurer intent.88  The
insurance industry must take care not to squander the words and
phrases that might be strung together to produce an effective pol-
icy exclusion by allowing each, in turn, to become invested with a
legal meaning that confounds the purpose of the provision. At the
same time, exclusionary terms must satisfy state "readability"
requirements by using words calculated to be understood accord-
ing to their "plain English" meanings by the majority of potential
policyholders.8 9 An effective terrorism exclusion will be one that
successfully marries simplicity of language with precision of pur-
pose in identifying sources of inestimable loss capable of produc-
ing claims so catastrophic as to invalidate rate-setting models
and destabilize the financial condition of the insurer.
88. See discussion supra Part II.B.
89. Most states have "readability" statutes or regulations requiring that policy lan-
guage achieve a certain "Flesch Reading Ease score" in order to be approved for use. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-295 to -300 (2001); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 27-1-26-1 to -12 (Mi-
chie 2001); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.14-420-.14-450 (Michie 2001); N.Y. INS. LAW §
3102 (McKinney 2000); 14 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5-110-10 to -80 (West 2001). In some
states, readability requirements apply only to coverage intended for consumers, rather
than those intended for more sophisticated commercial policyholders. However, given the
impact of the World Trade Center disaster on carriers of individual and group life insur-
ance, which are generally subject to these rules, contract exclusions intended for applica-
tion across multiple lines of insurance should be drafted so as to achieve compliance with
readability requirements.
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B. Exercise: The NAC's Proposed Definition
Acknowledging that the NAIC, of necessity, crafted its proposal
in the chaotic aftermath of September 11,90 it is instructive, both
as an illustration of the complexity of the insurers' task and as a
cautionary exercise, to examine the regulators' proposed defini-
tion of "act of terrorism:"
[An act, intentionally dangerous or destructive to human life,
health, tangible or intangible property or infrastructure, carried out
by a person or group that is not an agent of a sovereign state, but is
acting on behalf of an organization based in a country other than the
United States, and motivated by political, religious, or social be-
liefs.9'
As a preliminary matter, the proposed definition, standing
alone, does not satisfy the readability requirements imposed by
many states for various types of coverage.92 Although an isolated
definition generally would not be evaluated separately but would
be considered either as part of the policy form in its entirety or of
a word sample selected in accordance with the regulation, the ab-
sence of sentence-differentiating punctuation and the number of
multi-syllabic words used do not comport with the stated aims of
these simplified policy language rules.93 Corrective measures
needed include the use of short sentences or clauses separated by
semicolons or colons, the use of short, easily understood words,
and the use of additional definitions, expressed in simplified lan-
guage, to clarify any complex or technical terms that must be re-
tained in order to preserve the precision and accuracy of the defi-
nition as part of a legal document.94
90. See discussion supra notes 77-87 and accompanying text.
91. Kelly, supra note 86. According to Montana insurance Commissioner John Morri-
son, the phrase "not an agent of a sovereign state" is "intended to distinguish terrorism
from war, and the reference to motives is intended to distinguish acts of terrorism from
acts of vandalism." Id.
92. For example, calculated according to the methodology prescribed by Virginia's
regulation for simplified and readable accident and sickness insurance policies, 14 VA.
ADMIN. CODE § 5-110-50(D)(2) (West 2001), the text achieves a Flesch Reading Ease score
ofjust 0.56, far below the minimum required score of 40.
93. See id. § 5-110-50. The Virginia readability regulation, like most others that em-
ploy the Flesch Reading Ease Test, specifies that "[a] unit of words ending with a period,
semicolon, or colon, but excluding headings, captions, and subcaptions, shall be counted as
a sentence." Id. § 5-110-50(D)(4)(b).
94. Readability rules often provide that changes made to policy terms to improve their
readability must not interfere with the accuracy or adequacy of the contract. For example,
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As to ambiguity, the grammatical structure of the NAIC's pro-
posed definition gives rise to at least the following interpretive is-
sues:
(1) Whether the modifier "intentionally" pertains only to "dan-
gerous" or to both "dangerous" and "destructive";
(2) Whether "dangerous" stands alone, or pertains, like "de-
structive," to "human life, health, tangible or intangible property
or infrastructure";
(3) Whether "human" modifies only "life"; both "life" and
"health," or "life, health, tangible or intangible property or infra-
structure";
(4) Whether the phrase "tangible or intangible" pertains only to
"property," or to both "property" and "infrastructure";
(5) Whether "group" alone, or both "person" and "group," are
modified by the phrase "that is not an agent of a sovereign
state.. ."; and
(6) Whether it is the "person or group" or the "organization
based in a country other than the United States" that must be
"motivated by political, religious, or social beliefs."
Moreover, the elements of intent, sponsorship, and motivation
imbedded in the definition invite courts to define the terms in the
light "most favorable to the insured," which may create a result
radically different from the exclusionary intent of the insurers.
For example, if a hijacked airplane, intended to be flown into the
White House, instead nose-dives into an office building in Penn-
sylvania as passengers attempt to foil the hijackers' plan, could it
not be argued that contra proferentem compels the interpretation
that the losses resulted from the acts of the brave passengers and
were not due to "an act intentionally dangerous or destructive...
carried out by [terrorist(s)]?" If a terrorist "cell" comprised of for-
eign citizens legally residing in the United States who profess to
be disciples of Osama bin Laden, but who have received no train-
ing, funding, or other sponsorship from Al Qaeda, undertake a
suicide mission resulting in catastrophic loss of life and property,
are the losses excluded as resulting from an "act of terrorism" as
the Virginia readability regulation states that "[rievision of the policy to make it more
readable must not lead to its devaluation as a legal document." Id. § 5-110-50(A).
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defined, or are they covered because they are the result of domes-
tic criminal activity? If an organization claims motivation exclu-
sively based on religion for its violent activities, yet those activi-
ties are abhorrent to the official tenets of that religion and are
publicly renounced by its leaders, are these violent events "acts of
terrorism," or do they fail the motivation prong of the definition?
Finally, the proposed terminology used by the NAIC, without
further definition of key words and phrases, leaves room for mis-
interpretation. At a minimum, the terms "infrastructure," "sover-
eign," "acting on behalf of," and "based" require further clarifica-
tion.
C. Where Traditional War Exclusions Failed
It may be irrelevant now whether war exclusions might have
been construed to apply to the attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, given certain salient features of those events
that might have distinguished them from terrorist actions exam-
ined in earlier insurance cases.9" In any case, after September 11,
2001, "war" and "terrorism" are now interchangeable terms when
used as insurance shorthand for catastrophic acts of transna-
tional violence constituting uninsurable risks. Given the history
of war exclusion clauses, their probable ineffectiveness for elimi-
nating terrorist acts from the universe of insured events, and the
current opportunity for crafting and implementing effective ter-
rorism exclusions, however, insurers need to differentiate be-
tween the two in order to ensure adequate protection from liabil-
ity.
In crafting terrorism exclusions, insurers should be guided by
the reasoning of courts that have held specific war-risk exclusions
to be inadequate for purposes of excluding terrorism risks or have
assigned legal meaning to specific terms that might appear
within terrorism exclusions. If, conceptually, acts of war and acts
of terrorism exist as distinct categories of risk, drafters should
pay close attention to case law identifying the features courts
view as essential for characterizing a given event as one or the
other. Moreover, drafters should be guided by the overarching ob-
jective of deriving definitions appropriate for insurance purposes,
95. See sources cited supra note 62 and accompanying text.
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even where legal definitions of terms for other purposes may be
well established. In so doing, drafters should aim to eliminate any
definitional gaps that could result in the failure of an exclusion to
capture an uninsurable mega-catastrophe occurring in the gray
area between "war" and "terrorism."
There are few judicial cases addressing the distinctions be-
tween "war" and "terrorism" for insurance purposes; the most
relevant case and the one generally cited by commentators after
the World Trade Center disaster is Pan American World Airways,
Inc. v. The Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.96 The court in Pan Am
surveyed and summarized many of the earlier cases bearing on
aspects of the distinction, making the case a key source of infor-
mation on how various exclusionary terms will be construed .
Relevant delimiters provided by the case include the following:
(1) A "war," whether declared or undeclared, can exist only
where sovereign or quasi-sovereign entities engage in hostilities. 98
Terrorism exclusions should specify that terrorist acts may, but
need not, be committed on behalf of or sponsored by any sover-
eign or quasi-sovereign entity.
(2) An act of war cannot be committed by a terrorist group
other than a de facto government or an entity acting on behalf of
a government. 9  Terrorism exclusions should stipulate that a ter-
rorist act may, but need not, be committed by or on behalf of a
group that comprises a de facto government or a recognized
government.
(3) The actions of a "tiny non-governmental entity" fighting the
United States do not constitute "war" between the United States
and that entity.' ° Terrorism exclusions should make it clear that
the size of a terrorist organization is not relevant to the determi-
nation as to whether or not its act is excluded.
(4) Words describing violent events commonly used in war-risk
exclusions are construed as having "dimensions besides the level
96. 505 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1974).
97. See generally id. (discussing the proper manner by which to interpret exclusionary
terms in an insurance policy).
98. Id. at 1005; see also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Bennion, 158 F.2d 260, 264 (10th
Cir. 1946); Vanderbilt v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 184 N.Y.S. 54, 55 (1920).
99. Pan Am, 505 F.2d at 1012; see also Welts v. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 48 N.Y. 34,
40 (1871).
100. PanAm, 505 F.2d at 1019 n.15.
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of violence," which may include requirements that multiple actors
be involved.'0 ' For example, according to the Pan Am court, for
there to be a "'riot' three or more actors must gather in the same
place ... ,1o2 Similarly, "[f]or there to be a civil commotion, the
agents causing the disorder must gather together and cause a
disturbance ...". .""' Drafters should specify that excluded acts of
terrorism may be committed by one or more persons or entities.
Pan Am also provides a number of cautions for insurers with
respect to practices that may result in findings of ambiguity:
(1) Terms stipulating a number of specific types of excluded
conduct will not be construed as describing an inclusive contin-
uum of violent acts; rather, at least one of the specific types of
conduct must fairly describe the cause of the loss. °4 Terrorism
exclusions should be carefully drafted to avoid interpretations
that limit the excluded conduct to specific listed actions.
(2) An insurer's adoption of a new exclusion to deal with the
particular type of loss sustained by an insured within a short
time after the loss was incurred will be deemed evidence that the
insurer's previous exclusion language was ambiguous.'0 5 Care
should be taken to file and implement the most comprehensive
and clearest exclusionary language possible and to avoid being
forced to revise and refile after unanticipated losses have been in-
curred.
(3) In some jurisdictions, contra proferentem is applied in dis-
putes between insurers and reinsurers as well as in those be-
tween insurers and unsophisticated insurance consumers. 6 In
these jurisdictions, ambiguities may be resolved against the
drafter, even where the opposing parties are the insurer and the
reinsurer of the same risk and both are sophisticated parties. 7
OL Id. at 1005.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1020 (citing Hartford Fire Ins. Co v. War Eagle Coal Co., 295 F. 663, 665
(4th Cir. 1924)).
104. Id. at 1005 ("The ... insurers' shotgun approach belies its claim that these terms
have certain fixed meanings."); see also Younis Bros. & Co. v. CIGNA Worldwide Ins. Co.,
899 F. Supp. 1385, 1392 (E.D. Pa. 1995); Holiday Inns Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 571 F. Supp.
1460, 1461 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
105. Pan Am, 505 F.2d at 1000 (citing Orren v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 179 N.W.2d 166, 169
(Minn. 1970); Hartol Prod. Corp. v. Prudential Ins. Co., 47 N.E.2d 687, 690-91 (N.Y.
1943)).
106. Id. at 1002.
107. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reassessing the 'Sophisticated" Policyholder Defense in
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Since the insurer's exclusions are subject to filing and approval
by state insurance regulators, it is critical that the language filed
for inclusion in the primary contract be consistent with any rein-
surance agreement exclusions to avoid primary writer liability for
losses that will be unrecoverable under the terms of the carrier's
reinsurance agreements.
D. Revisiting the NAIC's Draft
Building upon the NAIC's draft definition and guided by both
readability considerations and the admonitions of the Pan Am
court, the author offers the following as a starting point from
which insurers might develop terrorism exclusions appropriate
for their particular products:
Losses due to acts of terrorism are not covered. For purposes of
this exclusion:
"Act of terrorism" means an act that is dangerous to or
destructive of:
* human life;
o human health; or
o property of any kind. This includes both tangi-
ble and intangible property. It includes real
property and personal property. It includes in-
frastructure such as roads, bridges, and tun-
nels; power systems and water systems; broad-
casting systems and computer systems.
The act must be planned or carried out by a person or
group acting on behalf of an organization based outside
of the United States.
The organization may be, but is not limited to, one that:
o claims to be motivated by political, religious, or
social beliefs; or
o aims to intimidate, influence, or coerce the
United States government or its citizens.
Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807, 840-42 (1993).
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The organization may, but need not, be:
* a sovereign entity-an independent state or
government;
* a quasi-sovereign entity--one that has some
traits of a sovereign entity; or
* a de facto government-one that has taken over
or separated from a regular government.
It need not be an organization of a particular size.
"Acting on behalf of" an organization means:
* acting as its agent or representative;
* affiliated with it; or
* being sponsored or supported by it in any way.
This includes receiving assistance, funding,
training, direction, or equipment from the
organization.
"Based outside of the United States" means founded, lo-
cated, headquartered, or maintaining a presence outside
of the United States.
"Losses due to acts of terrorism" includes losses incurred
in attempted acts of terrorism.'
V. CONCLUSION
The risk of unpredictable multi-billion dollar losses due to acts
of transnational terrorism is a risk that cannot currently be in-
sured against without exposing the insurance industry to danger-
108. This draft exclusion is consistent with the NAIC's intent not to categorize domes-
tic criminal acts as terrorism for purposes of its exclusion. See supra note 91 and accom-
panying text. Although it is beyond the scope of this Comment to address this decision, the
1995 bombing of the Murrah Building in Oklahoma City calls into question whether previ-
ously held assumptions about the capacity of the law enforcement system to prevent catas-
trophic terrorist acts perpetrated in the United States by United States citizens can sur-
vive as the basis for a determination of insurability. If the distinctions between war and
transnational terrorism have vanished in the context of insurability, distinctions between
transnational and domestic acts of terrorism, which may be equally unpredictable and re-
sult in losses of similar severity, should also be reconsidered.
In addition to the NAIC draft exclusion, several other deffiitions were taken into consid-
eration. See 18 U.S.C. § 2331 (1994); S. 1751, 107th Cong. § 3(1) (2001); H.R. 3210, 107th
Cong. § 16(1) (2001); S.B. 5798, 224th Sess. (N.Y. 2001); 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(1) (2001).
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ous financial destabilization and particular insurers to insol-
vency. Traditional war-risk exclusions are ineffective devices for
eliminating these exposures, despite certain present-day similari-
ties between war and terrorism. To protect themselves and the
ability of the industry to provide coverage for insurable risks, in-
surers must implement effective policy exclusions in order to ef-
fect the transfer of catastrophic terrorism risks and the assump-
tion of such losses by an alternate mechanism still to be identified
by Congress. Owing to the recent crisis, state insurance regula-
tors have generally agreed to approve terrorism exclusions, and
case law suggests that the courts will uphold them if-but only
if-they are written in a clear and unambiguous manner. Insur-
ers must be informed and guided by past judicial interpretations
in crafting such legally adequate and enforceable plain English
exclusions for losses due to terrorism.
Jane Kendall
